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Abstract: If the intelligence of artificial systems were to surpass that of 
humans significantly, this would constitute a significant risk for humani-
ty. Time has come to consider these issues, and this consideration must 
include progress in AI as much as insights from the theory of AI. The 
papers in this volume try to make cautious headway in setting the prob-
lem, evaluating predictions on the future of AI, proposing ways to en-
sure that AI systems will be beneficial to humans – and critically evalu-
ating such proposals. 
1. Introduction: Risk of AI
This is the first edited volume on the risks of AI and it originates from the first confer-
ence on risks of AI (AGI-Impacts). Following that conference we published a volume 
of selected papers in the Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence (JETAI) 
– (see Müller, 2014). Our volume generated significant interest: It had ca. 20.000 pa-
per downloads from the JETAI site alone in the first year; three of the top-five down-
loaded papers in JETAI are now from our volume. As a result, the publishers suggest-
ed turning the journal volume into a book and adding some recent material, so this is 
what you are holding in your hands. 
The notion that AI might generate existential risk to humanity has gained cur-
rency since we published the journal volume: Nick Bostrom’s book Superintelligence: 
Paths, Dangers, Strategies has come out (Bostrom, 2014), well known public intellectuals 
like Stephen Hawking and Stuart Russell have published warning notes in the general 
press (Hawking, Russell, Tegmark, & Wilczek, 2014) and a host of media publications 
have followed. The idea of existential risk in its Hollywood format is ‘the machines 
will take over and kill us all’ – this fear obviously strikes a cord. The spread of this fear 
has generated significant concern amongst academics in AI. One indication is that the 
current and past presidents of the AAAI (that most significant academic AI associa-
tion) wrote a short statement to the effect that “AI doomsday scenarios belong more in 
the realm of science fiction than science fact”, while they also “urge our colleagues in 
industry and academia to join us in identifying and studying these risks” (Ditterich & 
Horowitz, 2015). Recently, some efforts were made to outlined the research agenda 
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for AI that is beneficial for humanity, e.g. in the new ‘Future of Life Institute’ (Russell, 
Dewey, & Tegmark, 2015) and the renamed ‘Machine Intelligence Research Insti-
tute’, MIRI (Soares & Fallenstein, 2014).  
While the traditional concerns in the philosophy and theory of AI have focused 
on the prospects of AI, its relation to cognitive science and its fundamental problems 
(see the www.pt-ai.org conference series), we now see an increasing focus on matters 
of risk and ethics. But what is the general idea of this shift? 
2. The risks of artificial intelligence 
The notion of an agent with general intelligent ability is the original driving vision of 
AI research (see McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester, & Shannon, 1955) and dominates 
much of its public image – while nearly all actual current work in AI is on specialised 
technology, far removed from such a general ability, and often without use of the term 
“artificial intelligence”.  
The move from AI to risk is relatively easy: There is no reason to think that the 
level of human intelligence is anything special in the space of possibilities – it is easy to 
imagine natural or artificial intelligent agents that are vastly superior to us. There also 
seem to be reasons to think that the development of artificial intelligence is accelerat-
ing, together with related technologies, and that the invention of intelligent machines 
itself would further accelerate this development, thus constituting an ‘argument from 
acceleration’ for the hypothesis that some disruptive transformation will occur. So, if 
one thinks of intelligence as a quantifiable unit then this acceleration will continue and 
move past the (small) space that marks the intelligence of humans. So, we will reach 
‘superintelligence’, which Bostrom tentatively defines as “any intellect that greatly 
exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest” 
(Bostrom, 2014, p. 22). In an classic passage, Good has speculated that “the first ul-
traintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the 
machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control” (Good, 1965, section 
2). So, there is the risk that ‘the machines take over’ and this loss of control is a signifi-
cant risk, perhaps an existential risk for humanity (for a survey, see Sotala & 
Yampolskiy, 2013). 
The discussion of risk is not dependent on the view that AI is now on a successful 
path towards superintelligence – though it gains urgency if such ‘success’ is a non-
negligible possibility in the coming decades. It also gains urgency if the stakes are set 
high, even up to human extinction. If the stakes are so high as to include extinction of 
humankind, even a fairly small possibility of a disastrous outcome (say, 3%) is entirely 
sufficient to motivate the research. Consider that if there were a 3% possibility that a 
plane you are about to board will crash: That would be sufficient motivation for get-
ting off. The utility at stake in scientific or philosophical research is usually quite a bit 
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lower. It appears that the outcome of superintelligence is more likely to be extreme: 
either extremely bad or extremely good for humanity. 
As it happens, according to our recent research, the estimation of technical ex-
perts is that by 2050 the probability of high-level machine intelligence (that surpasses 
human ability in nearly all respects) goes beyond the 50% mark, i.e. it becomes more 
probable than not (Müller & Bostrom, forthcoming 2014). 2050 is also the mark that 
‘RoboCup’ set itself for fielding a robot team that can beat the human football world 
champions (actually an aim that does not make much sense). 
3. The papers 
The paper by Omohundro (2) introduces the problem of risk and the author presses 
his point that even an innocuous artificial agent, like one programmed to win chess 
games, can very easily turn into a serious threat for humans, e.g. if it starts acquiring 
resources to accomplish its goals: “The seemingly harmless chess goal therefore moti-
vates harmful activities like breaking into computers and robbing banks.” (section 4.2). 
He suggests that we need formal methods that provide proofs of safe systems, a “Safe-
AI Scaffolding Strategy”.  
The two following papers deal with prediction of coming success in AI: Arm-
strong/Sotala/O’Heigeartaigh (3) propose a decomposition schema to compare pre-
dictions on the future of AI and then test five famous predictions, from the Dartmouth 
Conference, Dreyfus, Searle, Kurzweil and Omohundro – with the result that they 
are poor, especially the optimistic ones. T. Goertzel (4) argues that while most pro-
gress in AI so far has been ‘narrow’ technical AI, the next stage of development of AI, 
for at least the next decade and more likely for the next twenty-five years, will be in-
creasingly dependent on contributions from strong-AI. 
From here, we go into the proposals on how to achieve safer and ethical general 
AI. In paper (5) Brundage investigates the general limitations of the approach to sup-
ply an AI with a ‘machine ethics’, and finds them both serious and deeply rooted in 
the nature of ethics itself. Yampolskiy (6) investigates which utility functions we might 
want to implement in artificial agents and particularly how we might prevent them 
from finding simple but counterproductive self-satisfaction solutions. B. Goertzel ex-
plains (7) how his “Goal-Oriented LEarning Meta-Architecture” (GOLEM) may be 
capable of preserving its initial – benevolent – goals while learning and improving its 
general intelligence. Potapov and Rodinov (8) outline an approach to machine ethics 
in AIXI that is not based on ‘rewards’ (utility) but on learning ‘values’ from more ‘ma-
ture’ systems. Kornai argues (9) that Alan Gewirth’s dialectical argument, a version of 
classic Kantian ethical rationalism, shows how an artificial agent with a certain level 
of rationality and autonomy will necessarily come to understand what is moral. Kor-
nai thus denies what Bostrom calls the ‘orthogonality thesis’ (Bostrom, 2012), namely 
that ethical motivation and intelligence are independent or ‘orthogonal’. 
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Last but not least, Sandberg (10), looks at the special case of general AI via whole 
brain emulation, in particular, he considers the ethical status of such an emulation: 
Would the emulation (e.g. of a lab animal’s brain) have the ability to suffer, would it 
have rights? 
In our new contributions for this volume Dewey (11) investigates strategies to mit-
igate the risk from a fast takeoff to superintelligence in more detail. Bishop (12) takes a 
different line and argues that there is no good reason to worry about existential risk 
from AI, but that we should rather be concerned about risks that we know are coming 
– such as the military use of AI. Like many people working in AI, Bishop remains un-
impressed by the discussion about risks of superintelligence because he thinks there 
are principled reasons why machines will not reach these abilities: they will lack phe-
nomenal consciousness, understanding and insight. 
4. Outlook: Ethics of AI and Existential Risks of AI 
These last two contributions are perhaps characteristic of a divide opening up in the 
debates between the ‘normal ethics’ side that stresses the challenges for AI and a ‘exis-
tential risks’ side that stresses the big challenges for humanity. In the ‘existential risks’ 
tradition, the traditionally central issues of consciousness, intentionality and mental 
content are literally dispensed with in a footnote (Bostrom, 2014, fn. 2 to p. 22) and 
embodied cognition is not mentioned at all, like any other cognitive science. 
I tend to think that both extremes are unlikely to be fruitful: to stick to the tradi-
tional problems and to ignore them. It is unlikely that nothing can be learned about 
the long-term future of AI from the critics of AI, and it is equally unlikely that nothing 
can be learned about that future from the actual success of AI. So, while Dreyfus is 
right to say that the history of AI is full of ‘first step fallacies’ that are similar to claim-
ing that “the first monkey that climbed a tree was making progress towards landing on 
the moon” (Hubert  L. Dreyfus, 2012, p. 92); Bostrom is right to say “From the fact 
that some individuals have overpredicted artificial intelligence in the past, however, it 
does not follow that AI is impossible or will never be developed.” (Bostrom, 2014, p. 
4). 
As I noted in my earlier editorial (Müller, 2014) (which shares some text with this 
one), the term ‘singularity’ is now pretty much discredited in academic circles – with 
the notable exception of (Chalmers, 2010) and the ensuing debate. It is characteristic 
that the only paper here that uses it (Bishop) is critical of the notion. Singularity is 
associated with ideological techno-optimism, trans-humanism and predictions like 
those of Ray Kurzweil (esp. Kurzweil, 2005; more recently Kurzweil, 2012) that ig-
nore the deep difficulties and risks of AI, e.g. by equating intelligence and computing 
power. What was the ‘Singularity Institute’ is now called the ‘Machine Intelligence 
Research Institute’ (MIRI). ‘Singularity’ is on its way towards becoming, literally, the 
trademark of a particular ideology, without academic credentials. 
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The most important thing between ‘existential risks’ and ‘normal ethics’ is to real-
ise that both sides could be wrong: It might be that superintelligence will never be 
developed (Bishop) and it might be that it will likely be developed (Bostrom) – but if 
both are possible then we would do well to look into the consequences (Bostrom), 
while taking the arguments about constraints (Bishop) into account. We need to talk. 
When we do that we will realise there is much to learn from the ‘other’ side: 
The problem of identifying the risks of general AI and even controlling them be-
fore one knows what form or forms that general AI might take, is rather formidable. 
To make things worse, we don’t know when the move from fairly good AI to a human 
and then superintelligent level might occur (if at all) and whether it will be slow 
enough to prepare or perhaps quite rapid – it is often referred to as an ‘explosion’ (see 
Dewey in this volume). As we have seen above, one might try to mitigate the risks 
from a superintelligent goal-directed agent by making it ‘friendly’ (see e.g. 
Muehlhauser & Bostrom, 2014), by ‘controlling’ or ‘boxing’ it or just by trusting that 
any superintelligent agent would be already ‘good’. All these approaches make rather 
substantial assumptions about the nature of the problem, however; for instance, they 
assume that superintelligence takes the form of an agent with goals, rather like us. It is 
even doubtful that some assumptions about agency are consistent: Can an agent have 
goals (rather than just a technical ‘utility function’) without having the ability for pain 
and pleasure, i.e. phenomenal experience? Of course, it is conceivable that superintel-
ligence will take very different forms, e.g. with no individuality or no goals at all, per-
haps because it lacks conscious experience, desires, intentional states or an embodi-
ment. Notoriously, classical critics of AI (Hubert L Dreyfus, 1992; Searle, 1980) and 
more recent cognitive science have provided arguments that indicate which directions 
AI is unlikely to take, and full agency is among them (Clark, 2008; Haugeland, 1995; 
Pfeifer & Bongard, 2007; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).  
Of course, superintelligence may constitute a risk without being an agent, but 
what do we really know about it, then? Even if intelligence is not deeply mysterious 
and fundamentally incomparable, as some people claim, it is surely not a simple prop-
erty with a one-dimensional metric either. So, just saying that a general artificial intel-
ligence is, well, ‘intelligent’, does not tell us much: As Yudkowsky urges, “One should 
resist the temptation to spread quantifiers over all possible minds.” (2012, p. 186) – if 
that is true, the temptation to say anything about the even larger set of ‘possible intel-
ligent systems’ is also to be resisted. Certainly, we should say what we mean by ‘intel-
ligent’ when we claim that ‘superintelligence’ is coming and would constitute existen-
tial risk. 
There is a serious question whether rigorous work is even possible at this point, 
given that we are speculating about the risks from something about which we know 
very little. The current state of AI is not sufficiently specific to limit that space of pos-
sibilities enough. To make matters worse, the object of our study may be more intelli-
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gent than us, perhaps far more intelligent, which seems to imply (though this needs 
clarification) that even if we were to know a lot about it, its ways must ultimately re-
main unfathomable and uncontrollable to us mere humans.  
Given these formidable obstacles our efforts are at danger to look more like theo-
logical speculation or ideological fervour than like science or analytic philosophy. We 
are walking a fine line and have to tread very carefully. The papers in this volume are 
trying to make some headway in this difficult territory since we remain convinced that 
cautious progress is better than rushing headlong into the dark. 
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